Anagogic Creativity & Divine Love

| Guido Reni - Angel of the Annunciation, c.1640 |

It is a staple of enlightenment philosophy and its consequent moral culture that “freedom” has come to approximate, or equate to “the freedom of the will from constraint”. This is the position commonly known as voluntarism. Usually, this is further qualified as the freedom “to do as one pleases so long as it does not infringe upon another”, or sometimes more radically; the freedom to self-assert as one pleases and so create one’s own moral constraints ex nihilo. The latter amounts to operating upon the basis of a hallucinated set of constraints that do not really exist in any real or formal fashion. Either way, both formulations seem to rest on the spontaneity of the individual’s self-causing. I stumbled upon this proposition from Proclus which perfectly illustrates how alien this view is to both the medieval and classical man, in his discussion of causality;

The originative cause of each series communicates its distinctive property to the entire series, and what the cause is primitively, the series is by remission.

For if it is sovereign over the whole series and all the members are grouped together by their relation to it*, it is plain that from it all derive the single form in virtue of which they are ranked under the same series. For either their common likeness to it is uncaused or all derive from their cause this element of identity. But the former supposition is impossible: for the uncaused is spontaneous; and spontaneity can never occur where there is order and continuity and perpetual freedom from variation. From its cause, then, the entire series receives the distinctive character proper to the being of that cause.

If so, it manifestly receives it with remission, that is, with the declension appropriate to secondary existences. For this character belongs either in the same degree to the antecedent term and to the rest – and how then can the one be antecedent, to others posterior in being? – or in an unequal degree. In the latter case it is plain that the identical element is derived by the manifold from the one; and not reversely; so that the distinctive character peculiar to the series, which pre-exists primitively in the unitary term, exists in the manifold by derivation.1

*Prop. 21

Spontaneity is effectively banished from the world by the Greek rationalists, to the sublunary world. Why is this so? It is precisely because, as it was for the medievals too, that this universal order is the best possible, true freedom being then constituted by an assent to its sublime Logos; supposed spontaneity is nothing more than an attempted interference with it. A key Dionysian insight to take in tandem is that this transcendent Logos, is Beauty-itself, “a light that flashes onto everything the beauty-causing impartations of its own well-spring ray” that gathers all things to revert upon it as their object of desire. The beautiful and the object to be “free to” collapse into an ineffable singularity2. Instead of being an object which gives off light, God is rather the ambient light itself whereby things are visible.  Freedom is thus in relation to that sublime wellspring from which one can confront and draw from for the outpouring of a purer creativity, as opposed to one that is lost, trying to project out schemes by its individual artifices. Love is likewise free, yet not spontaneous. God’s will is utterly free, yet as the Logos itself3, is in a sense spontaneous, which is to say that it is uncaused, but in another sense cannot be spontaneous as it is not arbitrary. Spontaneity of the creaturely kind, the one the Greeks dispensed with, could not be ascribed to God because it would imply disorder and privation as by way of a kind of capriciousness. Thus, as we do not speak of spontaneity in the same way as that of creatures, but in a similar fashion, we are speaking of God’s spontaneity, albeit in a delicate fashion, through analogy.

Along somewhat different lines now, I want to examine what we have discussed so far means for God’s love, but in a slightly polemical manner. Alexander Iulianus [henceforth: The Apostate4] writes that God does not love and has no will, in rebuke of St. Thomas Aquinas5. His retort can be summarised as; i) Aquinas’s argument rests on the “faculties of God”, but faculties imply not only distinction but also a lack, a two-fold privation. But this cannot be so as God is utterly perfect and absolutely simple. ii) Self-objectification violates simplicity through discursion, so God cannot be the object of himself whether by will, love or any such relation. iii) Will is the transitive mode whereby act is caused in being to move towards their perfection via either the primary (intellective) or secondary (sensitive) goods, God must not participate in this will because he is unmoved. It seems, therefore, that if God has no will, it cannot be said that God loves because love follows from will. Quoting The Apostate;

God, by his nature, is possessive of the whole and is the object of Good itself. Wholly Good and self-sufficient, any placing in God the transitive mode is to make deficiency. The ocean has no will towards any one portion of its waters, nor the whole Earth towards any one part of its totality, but yet both subsist in simple unions of being: the ocean simply the self-same whole of all its waters, the Earth simply the self-same whole of all its many particulars. In even these inferiors there is found no need for self-will, so we ought not give the efficiency of simple union to the material unions but then deny God this efficiency. 

Already, he dispels ii) for us himself. By being possessive of the whole, and wholly self-sufficient, and as utterly unlimited above all, God possesses himself entirely. That is to say, that by analogy, God stands as unsubjugated to any other principle. Humans do not possess themselves as they are subject to various other humans, and if subject to no humans, they are subject to the heavens and other such superior principles. As being subject to other such things, creatures do not self-possess, contrary to God who does so of himself. God’s self-possession is an apophatic double negative – he is not possessed by another so who else remains to possess him but himself? It is precisely because his unity with the Good, that is the object of all appetition, and himself is so intimate as to not be distinguishable from himself that he is utterly achieved. But if this is so, that he is the Good he has, there is no transitivity and so we can dispense with iii). We can also cast i) to the flames because Aquinas never predicates such faculties of God univocally, such that God has appetitive faculties as in creatures, but rather that;

Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.

So, we can speak of God as totally content with himself and with all that come from him6. Therefore, God’s self-objectification, creating no real distinction, is by our speaking in analogy. While this so far demonstrates that self-possession, which God’s will and self-knowledge take as necessary premises, amongst other attributes, does not violate his noetically superior simplicity, we have not demonstrated that it follows. The Apostate misses not only the manner of analogous predication but also, his illustrations using the ocean and the earth are very telling of his next error; in forgetting that we only come to speak of God’s will proceeding from having established divine intellect. The Apostate, in his various rhetorical illustrations, has robbed God of the noblest of attributes. However, following on the above proposition from Proclus, we need not do this to establish his will for it is this very self-communication through subsequent series that is God’s will. God imparts himself in a real manner to all that has unity, yet to will himself is to will The Good which is what he is, and to will goodness is what it means to Love, and so God loves all things even though he needs none of them. He can be said to will their good by merely holding them in existence in this intimate, immanent manner and so being their continual cause. He wills them to exist, he thus wills their good. As the object of all desire to be reverted upon, he also thus wills the good of all that can share in further intimacy with him in the antecedent. To talk of him “holding all things” through immanent omnipresence, and no further, needlessly brackets how subsequents are generated and sustained. With no priors, it is impossible for anything to cause God to create, and so the continuous act of creation whereby unity is given to all things other than God would have to be fundamentally free, and therefore willful. His omnipresence is indistinguishable from his will. He is his will, he Good-will, and so he is Love;

1 John 4:16 | We have learned to recognize the love God has in our regard, to recognize it, and to make it our belief. God is love; he who dwells in love dwells in God, and God in him.7

The semantic difference between, “God loves”, “Love exists in God”, and, “God is Love”, all have different conclusions. If it is the second, then The Apostate’s argument, specifically i), follows. Yet, as proclaimed by the Gospels, it is the latter, that God is Love – but then also the former, that God loves, as a consequent from establishing the indistinction between God and love-itself. So we can dispense with i) twice-over. Turning to Dionysius as quoted in Obj. 3 of the Summa article that The Apostate brings into question, that “Love is a uniting, and binding force”: God is Unity and Oneness itself8 9 10 , and also the cause of all things11 12 13. As the above Proclean proposition makes clear – that the originative cause is what the series is by remission – we have on our hands sound means by which to once more conclude that God not only is love-itself but that he loves. God is the subsistent unity that is responsible for the unity of all things14 15 16, and so naturally;

Wisdom 11:25 | For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made: for thou didst not appoint, or make any thing hating it.17

Everything that has unity, as such, goodness, has God as its cause and so clearly then God loves all things, willing them every perfection they possess. God’s love causes perfection in things, and one thing would not be better than another unless God loved it more.18 As individuated things such as the ocean and earth have no will, and of course no self-motion, they cannot have the Good as their object. So to dispel ii) twice over, let us return to elaborating upon God’s intellect, because it is in the same manner that God is his intellect that he is his will. For Aquinas, intellect has noetic primacy over will even though they are one and the same with God. The simple formulation is that immateriality and intellection are convertible. God is the cause of all abstract objects that inhere in particulars, and so given the principle of proportionate causality, God must possess something analogous to intellect whereby all such objects exist in Him, not entitatively but analogous to the way in which forms exist “intentionally” in our intellects. The divine ideas pre-exist in him as their cause which he so knows by his essence which all participate in some degree of likeness. So, privation of knowledge corresponds with limiting the actuality of a given thing, so we should affirm that in his infinitude, God is a simple and infinite intellect.19 For a further exploration on the congruency of the divine mind with divine simplicity, head on over to this Feser post.

But I will here break with Aquinas and affirm Meister Eckhart’s formulation that Intellect is also primary to being, and not just noetically so, but actually so. God does not know because he is, rather; est ipsum intelligere fundamentum ipisus esse. He is because he knows. Since being is proper to creatures, it is in God only as in its cause: it is not there formally. Meister Eckhart reintroduces the Proclean subordination of being into the Medieval tradition, affirming that, “as soon as we come to being, we come to creature.” If God is perfect intellect and the imperfect agent intellect knows being as created thing, God’s knowledge being without object has to be radically unconditioned. 

A common objection is in citing Exodus. 3:14 as an ontological affirmation of being. Yet in an unexpected manner, “I am who I am,” affirms this Proclus-influenced doctrine of the Meister. If God had wished to declare himself as being, he would’ve terminated his proclamation of himself at “I am”, yet he did not. If we met someone by night, Etienne Gilson illustrates to us, and wished to remain unknown when asked, “who are you?” One answers: “I am who I am.”19 And this is what Moses was answered with. Identity is left unconditioned, ephemeral; which is to say that God bypasses identity as he is totally divested of individuation. Thus being does not belong to God. The Meister tells us that God is puritas essendi, pure of all being, and by reason of such utter purity with regard to being, can be its cause. To turn Aristotle against Aquinas; Aristotle noted sight to be colourless to see colour or else its capacity is limited20, contrary to Empedocles and Democritus who held that the eye should see in virtue of some thing that issues from it21, which is backwards – God must be pure of being so he might be the cause of all being.  We must first speak of God as other, before we speak of him as cause. God stands est aliquid altius ente; higher than being in possessing all ahead of him in purity. His plenitude and perfection are the root of all, hence the fittingness of “I am who I am”, so that an anteriority to being is identified here with the act of intellection. This becomes even clearer with reference to the Gospel of John, for in the beginning was the Logos, so it follows scripturally so that intellection is the foundation of all being. Gilson notes that the Logos said of himself, “I am the Truth”22, which is to say sapientia: Wisdom. And so the Meister is correct to conclude that insofar as God is intellect he is free of all, including being. As St. Augustine before him, the Meister ranks understanding above being and life as well. The ocean and the earth “are” but do not know. Material entities are imperfectly unified as they are subject to individuation: immaterial and intelligent beings are not strictly unity because they are intelligent-beings, that is creatures whose being is not unconditioned intellection alone. It is thus only pure intellect that can be pure unity; it is one and the same to say that God is wholly Intellect and God is One. The desert of deity, the divine essence is ineffable, pure intellect which Eckhart identifies with the Father, St. Athanasius’s “One Father”; a fecund unity that is thus paternity. 

Similarly for us, as I have spoken of elsewhere, the reception of Christ by a virgin, Meister Eckhart holds to also allegorically signify the fact that for God’s knowledge to manifest, the intellect must too be ‘void’. Plato’s famous midwifery of sophia from the Symposium finds the purest offspring begotten from a virgin – Truth itself, Wisdom itself being conceived without concupiscence and born from a virgin who remained thereafter, forever a virgin. As long as the active intellect is dominant and occupied with abstraction, thought, imagination, and perception, the mind will remain incapable of receiving the unconditioned Truth and so likewise must be as divested of attachments to individuated phantasms. This is the condition of abgeschiedenheit or “disinterestedness” where the faithful can stand noble and above, without anchorage to that which may dilute the wellspring of divine inspiration. 

Under a more trinitarian light23, the hypostatic union of three loving persons can be thought of as a scene; one wherein the agents on the scene are not the same but share in the most real of unities; the homonoia they participate in that makes the scene a unity. However unlike a scene of representation such as a human community – while The Father is not The Son, who is not The Spirit, who is not The Father; all three are God – their union is far more intimate than any human community could be. After all, theirs is the primal unity that generates all subsequent manifold unities through differentiation. Being “created in the image of God”, and thus in the image of the Trinity, then also has some interesting connotations. This means that humans are moments of particularly intense and adaptive recollection within the temporal process, although such recollection is constitutive of the temporal process itself. A present moment “is”, in its repetitive holding of the past. Yet in this recollecting, it escapes at one level the temporal continuum and arrives as a meaning – abstracted from, and then unified with form, to create structures of various kinds – a process which has bestowed upon it a fluid capacity for adaptation and expansion from the primal fount from which being overflows. As St. Catherine of Siena so beautifully puts it, “the soul is in God and God in the soul, just as the fish is in the sea and the sea in the fish.”24

This comes to the heart of what sympoiesis truly means. We do not create something beautiful without another, without beauty itself, and so all “doing” that has a share in beauty is one that is assisted by grace. The pen of the poet, the brush of the artist, the hands of the virtuoso pianist are guided by the will of God. In all such cases, such creative acts, such acts of beauty are only so through the community established between man and the divine. Sacrality involves representing the gesture, constituted by religio, as compelled by divinity. Aesthetics involves discerning the intentions of the centre – such intentions being constituted by cosmological recursion and revelation – through the attention of others on the scene i.e. unfolding philosophical and exegetical corpus/priesthood and rituals they administer25. In this sense, knowledge depends upon aesthetics, and only aesthetic oscillation can dissolve those desires into the manifold forms of attention directed towards God. Naturally, all disciplines should be reintegrated into theology, to desecularise all other disciplines as a consequence of our abolition of the distinction between art and anagogic reverence. Just as with the fish and the sea, when the soul receives the sacrament, and when the apparent bread has been consumed, Christ leaves behind an imprint of his grace;

…just as a seal that is pressed into warm wax leaves its imprint when it is lift­ed off. Thus does the power of this sacrament remain there in the soul; that is, the warmth of my divine charity, the mercy of the Holy Spirit, remains there. The light of my only-begotten Son’s wisdom remains there, enlightening the mind’s eye.26

This all dovetails quite beautifully with Marsilio Ficino’s exploration of God and love. When we seek God through reason alone, we extoll much effort through a lot of time, especially if we take our acetic cues from the likes of the Meister, to make very little progress. But by loving Him, Ficino tells us, we make much progress in a very short time. 

The reason love unites the mind with God more swiftly, closely and firmly than cognition is that the power of cognition lies mainly in making distinctions but the power of love lies in union.27

Precisely because we come to know things discursively, mediated by concepts and ideas which themselves do not bless a man – unlike God who as simplex is Love and Wisdom – for man, love transcends the dialectic not just wherein the dialectic terminates in its ability to unite us with the Divine but entirely so by love’s very nature as unifying. As unity is itself one with the Good, it is by nature superior to our intellect. We might then transfigure Eckhart’s proclamation of Intellect’s anteriority to being with the equally true formulation that; “God is because he Loves.” Our intellect alone traverses only intelligibles themselves, that is to say, beings of which God stands as utterly superior to, which is why we speak of him through analogy. Hence also the superiority of the devotional life to the purely contemplative life. The life of the mere philosopher is quite radically incomplete. It lacks love and so also finds itself with a real creative limit. It is due unto the wellspring of divine love, the warmth of charity, that the philosopher finds his full realisation; his full intimacy with Wisdom. In order to thoroughly know, we must first love, to then become purely receptive to sapientia, so that we might be truly free.

A soul rises up, restless with tremendous desire for God’s honor and the salvation of souls. She has for some time exercised herself in virtue and has become accustomed to dwelling in the cell of self-knowledge in order to know better God’s goodness toward her, since upon knowledge follows love. And loving, she seeks to pursue truth and clothe herself in it.28

 

 

 

[NOTES]

[1] Proclus and Dodds, E. The Elements Of Theology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, Prop. 97.

[2] Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works. The Divine Names. New Jersey: Paulist Press, 4.vii 701C-704B.

[3] John 1:1-4 | In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men.

[4] à la Julian the Apostate, Pagan Neoplatonist and Roman Emperor who wrote polemical works, as did Porphyry, against Christianity — while I will admonish Alexander for his affinity for heathenry, he’s still a king.

[5] Aquinas, Thomas., The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920. Prima Pars, Q:19:1.

[6] Genesis 1:31 | And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And the evening and morning were the sixth day.

[7] As per usual, I always either quote from the Knox Translation Bible or Douay-Rheims. Sometimes a mix but the above is purely Douay-Rheims.

[8] Proclus and Dodds, E. The Elements Of Theology. Prop. 13

[9] Pseudo-Dionysius. Divine Nom., 13.ii

[10] Galatians 3:20 | Now a mediator is not of one: but God is one.

[11] Proclus and Dodds, E. The Elements Of Theology. Prop. 10

[12] Aquina’s Second Way Prima Pars, Q:2:3

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiæ, Second and Revised Edition, Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920. 

[13] 1 Corinthians 11:12 | For as the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman: but all things of God.

[14] Proclus and Dodds, E. The Elements Of Theology. Prop. 3

[15] Colossians 1:16 | For in him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him and in him.

[16] 1 Corinthians 8:5-6 | For although there be that are called gods, either in heaven or on earth (for there be gods many, and lords many); Yet to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him.

[17] Douay-Rheims again.

[18] Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiæ, Prima Pars, Q:20:3.

[19] Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, 110-111.

[19] Gilson, Etienne. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages , 438.

[20] Aristotle. The Complete Works, Sense and Sensibilia. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. 3, 439a8-14.

[21] ibid., 2, 438a25-28.

[22]  John 14:6 | Jesus saith to him: I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father, but by me.

[23] See: Milbank, J., 1991. Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa in Forthy Two Responses to Unasked Questions. Modern Theology, 7(3), 225-237.

[24] St. Catherine of Siena, The Dialogues. New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2, 27.

[25] My spin on Katz’s logic of aesthetics;

Sacrality involves representing the gesture as compelled by the object; aesthetics involves discerning the intentions of the centre through the attention of others on the scene. p.90

Aesthetics would serve the purpose of introducing, welcoming, drawing participants into the sacred scene, providing ways for those participants to inhabit the scene and minimize the distance between ritual performance and the scene of origin. p.91

Knowledge depends upon aesthetics; only a centre free of usurpationist desires can sustain attention on the gap in imperatives issued by the centre, and only aesthetic oscillation can dissolve those desires into the manifold forms of attention directed towards that centre. p.92

Bouvard, D., Anthropomorphics. Perth: Imperium Press.

[26] St. Catherine of Siena, The Dialogues. 112, 211.

[27] Allen, J.B., Michael,  Rees, V., Davies, Martin. Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy. The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2002, 211.

[28] St. Catherine of Siena, The Dialogues. 1, 25.